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Abstract 
  This paper examines partial privatisation in a price-setting mixed duopoly model to 
reassess the welfare effect of production subsidies. It is shown that the result of this study 
is basically the same as that of the existing quantity-setting mixed market model. 
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1. Introduction 
  Recently, many researchers have done a lot of work on privatisation of public firms 
(e.g., Gronberg and Hwang, 1992; Anderson et al., 1997; Bosi et al., 2005; Chang, 2005; 
Chao and Yu, 2006; Han and Ogawa, 2008; Capuano and De Feo, 2010; Ohnishi, 2012; 
Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón, 2017). White (1996) investigates how production subsidies 
influence the privatisation decision in a quantity-setting mixed oligopoly market and 
presents the following three main results. First, if production subsidies are utilised before 
and after privatisation, privatisation does not change economic welfare. Second, if 
production subsidies are utilised only before privatisation, there is a reduction in 
economic welfare. Third, the production subsidy contributes to overall efficiency in a 
mixed oligopoly market because of cost distribution effects. Poyago-Theotoky (2001) and 
Myles (2002) show that the optimal production subsidy is identical irrespective of 
whether (i) a public firm moves simultaneously with n private firms, (ii) it acts as a 
Stackelberg leader, or (iii) all firms behave as profit-maximisers. 
  The analysis by Fershtman (1990) examined a mixed duopoly model in which the 
government owned a partial share of a firm that was the Cournot competitor of a private 
firm. Since then, many researchers have contributed to the theoretical analysis of partial 
privatisation of state-owned public firms (e.g., Matsumura, 1998; Lu and Poddar, 2007; 
Saha and Sensarma, 2008; Artz et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2009; Heywood and Ye, 2010; 
Ohnishi, 2010, 2016; Wang and Lee, 2010; Chen, 2017; Heywood et al., 2017; Fridman, 
2018). Tomaru (2006) studies partial privatisation in quantity-setting mixed oligopoly 
competition with subsidies and shows that the optimal subsidy and economic welfare are 
identical regardless of the level of privatisation of a public firm. In this paper, we examine 
a price-setting mixed market model to reassess the subsidy effect of partial privatisation. 
  The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the basic setting. 
Section 3 presents the result of this study. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper. 
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2. Basic setting 
  Consider an industry composed of a private firm (firm 1) and a partially privatised firm 
(firm 0) which is jointly owned by both the public and private sectors. Both firms produce 
imperfectly substitutable goods. Throughout this paper, subscripts 0 and 1 represent firm 
0 and firm 1, respectively. In addition, when i  and j  are used to represent firms in an 
expression, they should be understood to refer to 0 and 1 with i j . We do not consider 
the possibility of entry or exit. The basic setting is taken from Bárcena-Ruiz (2007). Firm 
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where 0a , 0 1b , and ip  is firm i’s price. For simplicity, we assume 0.5b . 
Firm i’s profit is given by 
  ( )i i ip c s q                                                  (2) 
where c  denotes the total cost for each unit of output and s  is the subsidy for each unit 
of output. Firm 1 aims to maximises (2). We assume 0 c a  to assure that the firms’ 
production levels are positive. 
  Economic welfare is given by 
  0 1 0 1( )W CS s q q                                           (3) 
where 2 20 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1( ) ( ) / 2CS a q q q q q q p q p q  represents consumer surplus. 
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where [0,1]  represents the level of privatisation. That is, if 0  firm 0 is purely 
private, whereas if 1  it is purely public. 
  The game model has two stages. In the first stage, the government sets the production 
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subsidy to maximise economic welfare for a given . In the second stage, both firms 
simultaneously and independently choose their prices. In this paper, we solve for the 
subgame perfect equilibrium through backward induction. 
3. Main result 
  As usual, the game is solved by backward induction. Starting from the second stage, we 
obtain the reaction functions in prices of the two firms: 
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Furthermore, from (5) and (6), we derive the second-stage equilibrium prices in terms of 
s : 
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  When setting 0s  in (7) and (8), we obtain 0 1(0, ) (0, )p p  with equality if firm 
0 is completely privatised. As the level of  rises from 0 to 1, firm 0 becomes interested 
in consumer surplus. Firm 0 has an incentive to charge a lower price than firm 1 and to 
sell more than firm 1 so as to raise consumer surplus. Therefore, without the production 
subsidy, firm 0’s price is lower than firm 1’s price while firm 0’s output exceeds firm 1’s 
output. 
  We now consider the first stage of the game. In the first stage, taking into account how 
firms will react to the subsidy, the government sets the subsidy to maximise (3). We 
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Since 0 c a , *s  is strictly positive, so that the government will always grant a 
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positive subsidy. 
  We obtain the following subgame perfect equilibrium values: 
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  Note that the optimal subsidy achieves the first-best outcome in which price equals 
marginal cost. Also note that the equilibrium values do not depend on . 
  Now we can state the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: The optimal subsidy, economic welfare, and firms’ profits are identical 
regardless of the privatisation level of firm 0. 
 
From this proposition, we find that our result is the same as that of the quantity-setting 
market model obtained by Tomaru (2006). 
4. Conclusion 
  We have examined partial privatisation in a price-setting mixed duopoly game to 
reassess the welfare effect of production subsidies. We have shown that the optimal 
subsidy and both firms’ profits are identical regardless of the share of the partially 
privatised firm that is owned by the public. In consequence, we have found that our result 
is basically the same as that of the existing quantity-setting mixed market model. 
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